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Introduction
During the first years of the twentieth century Belgian King Leopold II and his 
bloody colonial regime in Congo became the subject of what is sometimes con-
sidered the first modern international human rights campaign.1 Large numbers 
of scholarly and popularizing works have been written about the influential 
‘name and shame’-campaign in which prominent figures such as Edmund D. 
Morel, Roger Casement, Arthur Conan Doyle, Mark Twain, Anatole France and 
others protested against the Congo atrocities and which played an important 
role in Leopold’s political demise and the enforced transformation in 1908 of 
his quasi privately-run Congo Free State into a formal Belgian colony. A far less-
known aspect of this historical episode, however, is the role and impact of the 
commission of inquiry that Leopold, under international political pressure, set 
up in 1904 in order to look into the atrocities attributed to his own colonial rule.
The limited attention paid to the Congo Commission in recent academic 
literature stands in sharp contrast with the enormous amount of media coverage 
this commission received at the beginning of the twentieth century, not only in 
Belgium, but also in the UK, France, Germany, the USA and elsewhere. When 
the commission was created this was widely perceived as a major political 
event and its report provoked heated national and international debates. The 
limited recent scholarly interest is also remarkable because the relatively few 
commentators who did discuss the Congo Commission throughout the twen-
tieth century until today, have generally ascribed it great significance and used 
its findings to support strongly diverging and even contradictory arguments.
Some have described the commission’s report as a true indictment against 
Leopold and as a defining moment of truth after which denial of the Congo 
atrocities was no longer possible.2 This interpretation is found throughout the 
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twentieth century until today. As late as 2012 and 2014, for example, the com-
mission’s report was cited as evidence of Leopold’s crimes in two proposals for 
resolutions in Belgian parliament.3 Sometimes the commission is remembered 
in a heroic mode as a direct cause of the fall of Leopold’s Congo Free State. One 
such reading is found in an article from 1950 by the prominent Belgian historian 
Jean Stengers. The commission’s ‘moral courage’ and truth telling, according 
to Stengers, played a key role in Belgian and Congolese history, since ‘it has 
been the direct origin of the takeover of Congo by Belgium’.4 Similar heroic 
interpretations of the role of the commission are found among contemporary 
observers. The influential Belgian jurist, philanthropist and banker Félicien 
Cattier, for example, shortly after the publication of the commission’s report 
stated that the latter enabled the ‘triumph of truth’ and changed the tenor of 
debates on the Congo atrocities ‘as by the touch of a magic stick’. He concluded 
that after the commission’s incriminating revelations the immediate annexation 
of Congo by Belgium became the only ‘honorable’ solution.5
A smaller, but persistent, group of commentators, in contrast, has claimed 
that the commission’s report should rather be seen as the final acquittal of 
Leopold after a libellous campaign by envious rival colonial powers. This thesis 
is also found among contemporary commentators (see below), throughout the 
twentieth century6 and until today. In 2015, for example, a voluminous book 
was published in which the acquittal-thesis is postulated.7
In this article I will address the questions of why these contradictory 
assessments exist, how the Congo commission contributed to the dynamics 
of acknowledgment and denial in Belgium and how it influenced the history 
of Belgian colonialism in the long term. Yet, by offering a detailed analysis of 
the Congo Commission I also want to contribute to our understanding of the 
broader phenomenon of public inquiries which have since long been a wide-
spread practice in the aftermath of violent events, catastrophes or political 
crises.8
Various functions have been ascribed to public inquiries – including their 
more recent ‘distinctive manifestation’ in the form of truth commissions9 – and 
the general scholarly interpretations and evaluations of the purpose and impact 
of these inquiries are hardly less divergent and contradictory than those of the 
Congo Commission in particular. Much like Stengers, optimistic commen-
tators claim that commissions of inquiry can ‘set-straight’ historical records, 
fight denialism and function as a check on the power of governments by cou-
rageously speaking truth to power.10 More sceptical commentators, however, 
consider commissions of inquiry primarily as instruments of governance. Frank 
Burton and Pat Carlen, for example, describe public inquiries as a key source 
of ‘official discourse’ and claim they primarily serve to legitimate the state.11 
Similarly, Adam Ashforth, places public inquiries squarely into the Foucauldian 
frame of social control and governance by ‘knowledge-power’.12
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The aim of this article is not to offer a general theory about public inquiries 
nor to prove or disprove the general validity of the optimistic or pessimistic 
interpretations mentioned above. By presenting the complex case of the Congo 
Commission, I rather want to broaden and refine our understanding of the 
functioning and potential impact of public inquiries. I especially want to tran-
scend the dichotomous opposition between an all too optimistic interpretation 
that exaggerates the power and heroism of ‘truth telling’ by commissions of 
inquiry and an all too sceptical one which simply sees these commissions as 
puppets of the state which cannot seriously challenge hegemonic discourse. 
In order to do this I will focus on the type of truth claims that were made by 
the Congo Commission (which sort of epistemic authority did it claim and 
how?), how these claims were received in the popular media and scholarly 
environments and how the findings of the commission were influenced by, and 
in their turn influenced, scholarly and popular ideas on what should or should 
not be considered trustworthy and valuable knowledge relating to colonialism.
I will argue that the Congo inquiry can indeed be considered an important 
politico-intellectual event that seriously challenged Leopold’s rule in Congo 
and functioned as a major catalyst in the construction of the Belgian colo-
nial project. Yet, I will argue, that the commission’s impact was indirect and 
did not result from a heroic speaking truth to power or from exceptionally 
strong or convincing truth claims which created a general sense of revelation 
in the Belgian public. Although I do not want to deny that the commissioners 
generally took their job seriously and that (some of them) did show real cour-
age speaking out against the interests of the king, my analysis is anti-heroic. I 
will present the commissioners as insecure and not fully in control and their 
report as far too ambiguous and epistemologically frail to constitute a defining 
moment of truth. The commission paradoxically combined a de jure position 
of institutionally authorised (in the sense of officially commissioned) writing 
with a de facto inability to claim substantively authoritative (in the sense of 
widely accepted) knowledge or expertise concerning several of the main sub-
jects discussed in its report.13 A close reading of the report reveals that the 
commissioners generally did not succeed in convincingly speaking a classic 
forensic language of ‘fact’. Large parts of the report were not even based on 
acts of inquiry in the strict sense of the term – which Foucault aptly described 
as a procedure based on testimony, aiming at ‘reactualizing what has tran-
spired’, and organised around the questions of whether or not something has 
happened, when and where it happened and who did it.14 Rather than being 
characterised by the retrospective gaze of more traditional judicial practices of 
inquiry, I will argue that the commission’s report was largely prospective and 
primarily engaged in a reflection on the behavioural potentialities rather than 
past actions of people – an epistemic practice which Foucault described as 
‘examination’ (l’examen) rather than ‘inquiry’ (l’enquête) and whose relatively 
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recent genealogy he related to the rise of human sciences such as sociology, 
psychology, criminology, and psychoanalysis.15
By engaging in an examination of the customs and behavioural potentialities 
of the Congolese, rather than sticking to a more classic inquiry, the conven-
tionally trained jurists of the commission moved far beyond their usual field 
of expertise and, as I will show below, they did not succeed in fully obtaining 
epistemic authority in so doing. The move from inquiry to examination made 
the commission remarkably vulnerable to criticism.
Yet, I argue, it was precisely the particular combination of formal authority 
and substantive epistemic frailty or even epistemic failure that enabled the 
commission’s profound impact. The importance of the commission was not 
primarily related to the factual insights it yielded but rather to how it changed 
(or enabled others to change) the ‘hierarchies of credibility’16 between differ-
ent knowledge claims and systems concerning colonial affairs in Belgium and 
how it enabled a new and broader part of the Belgian elite to engage in these 
matters and produce new kinds of discourse on them. If the publication of the 
commission’s report became a politico-intellectual event, it was because it con-
tributed to a (limited) epistemic crisis which unsettled precarious balances of 
epistemic authority and enabled the breakthrough of a new ‘epistemic culture’17 
and subject position which until then had only existed in a very embryonic state 
in Belgium: that of so-called colonial science and the colonial scientist. I argue 
that this epistemic crisis and the related rise of a discourse on colonial science 
were highly productive for the project of Belgian colonialism and can be seen 
as a necessary first step toward Belgium’s later patriotic self-representation and 
legitimation as a model colonizer.18
In order to explain this argument I first have to introduce the influential 
thesis that Belgians were ‘reluctant imperialists’.19 The most straightforward 
versions of this thesis claims that Belgians did not want to become colonizers 
and were reluctant to take over the Congo from their king but that they eventu-
ally did so in order to repair the situation in the Congo and simultaneously free 
Belgium from the bad name it had (‘undeservedly’) received due to what was 
called an international ‘congophobe’ campaign. In this form the ‘reluctant impe-
rialism’-thesis is clearly too simplistic and can be used to get rid of Belgians’ 
responsibilities for the atrocities of the Congo Free State.20 Yet, I do believe 
the takeover of Congo by Belgium was not a self-evident thing and that in the 
beginning there existed a real reluctance amongst several layers of the popu-
lation. Even though, as Matthew Stanard and Guy Vanthemsche have argued, 
many Belgians would soon become convinced colonialists and although it can 
be argued that a real ‘colonial culture’ would eventually develop in Belgium,21 
colonizing the Congo initially did not come naturally to Belgians. Congolese 
affairs for a long time had effectively been quasi monopolized by the king and 
his relatively small groups of Belgian and foreign collaborators and it could have 
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remained that way. Belgians’ initial reluctant imperialism, however, generally 
had little to do with humanitarian concerns for the fate of the Congolese or 
with a principled anti-colonialism, but was primarily related to a pessimism 
about or fear of the practical effects of colonisation on Belgium. Part of this 
pessimism or fear was material (what will the costs be?22) and governmental 
(what about a possible rebellion by a ‘black spartacus’?23), but there was also 
a combination of learning and unlearning that had to be done by the Belgian 
elite in order to become an imperial elite.24 Belgians had imagined themselves 
at least since their independence (in 1830) primarily as victims of imperial-
ism – since their national territory, according to the nationalist rhetoric, had 
been ‘occupied’ or even ‘colonized’ by foreign powers since time immemorial. 
It took some efforts for the Belgians to turn around this national imagination 
and create a new self-image as imperial power.25
For this process of learning and unlearning, the Congo commission was 
of key importance. The commission, I argue, helped Belgian elites to become 
imperial elites in three entangled ways. Firstly, by using its official mandate and 
prestige to venture into relatively unexplored intellectual territories (relating to 
colonial ethnology, sociology and psychology among others) while remaining 
unable to effectively ‘occupy’ these territories by successfully asserting epis-
temic authority over them, the commission opened up an intellectual space 
which by some aspiring colonialists was seen as an intellectual terra nullius 
which could freely be annexed. The commission indeed catalysed a scramble 
for colonial epistemic authority which would strongly contribute to the devel-
opment of the field colonial science in Belgium. Secondly, by opening up this 
perceived intellectual terra nullius of colonial science and by provoking a more 
general discussion on the Congo, the commission enabled a much broader 
part of the Belgian elite intellectually to appropriate the colonial project, which 
until then had mostly been monopolized by (military) colonial personnel, 
missionaries and a small club of top jurists working for King Leopold. Thirdly, 
by its particular epistemic approach and by enabling the rise of a discourse of 
colonial science, the commission helped to transform an initially quasi-forensic 
debate about guilt or innocence into a discourse about rational colonialism 
and social reform in which the actual atrocities moved to the background and 
were quickly conceived as a thing of the past. Commentators increasingly came 
to refer to the situation in the Congo as a social ‘question’ which much like 
any social question (such as those concerning poverty, labor conflicts, public 
hygiene etc.) demanded forward looking and rational reform rather than a 
retrospective gaze. By enabling the transformation of the Congo scandal into 
the Congo question, the commission and its interlocutors not only enabled 
Belgium to become a colonial power without losing face internationally or 
incriminating its own king, but at once gave its colonial project a sense of 
purpose and legitimacy.
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The Congo Free State and the international campaign against the 
Congo atrocities
Until the end of the nineteenth century Belgium had nearly no colonial or 
imperial tradition; along with Germany and Italy the country belonged to the 
club of ‘colonial latecomers’.26 The Belgian King Leopold II obtained his African 
colony through a combination of armed conquests, cunning and often forced 
treaties with local chiefs, and a diplomatic game in which he outmanoeuvered 
other colonial powers.27 After promising to engage in a civilising mission, to 
suppress slavery and create a realm of free trade, Leopold succeeded in getting 
himself recognized by the Conference of Berlin of 1884–1885 as the sovereign 
of a newly created independent country, the so-called Congo Free State or Etat 
Indépendant du Congo.28 Although the Belgian government would offer finan-
cial and logistical support, many Belgian citizens would become active in Congo 
and much of the revenue from Congo would end up in Belgium, no formal 
legal ties initially existed between the two countries other than their sharing 
the same king. For about two decades Leopold ruled the Congo Free State as a 
quasi private dominion. This changed between 1906 and 1908 when the king 
was forced to leave his colony to Belgium due to strong political pressure.29
After an initial period of massive budget deficits and poor economic pros-
pects, Leopold and his collaborators during the early 1890s developed an 
exploitation model of colonisation whereby they tried to extract as much rev-
enue as possible out of the country – primarily in the form of ivory and rubber, 
and on the basis of forced labour – without any concern for the human costs. 
During the 1890s and 1900s, a culture of violence developed in large parts of the 
Congo Basin under Leopold’s rule and the social, demographic and psychologi-
cal impact of the colonial terror was massive in the short-as well as long-term.30
After around two decades the Leopoldian regime in Congo became the 
subject of an extensive international campaign which criticized its violent and 
exploitative character. The accusations included general exploitation of the pop-
ulation, forced labour, bloody military expeditions, mutiliations, but also that 
Leopold engaged in monopolistic economic policies which violated agreements 
on international free trade. The first gruesome stories and testimonies were 
published in travelers reports, most famously the open letter written to King 
Leopold in 1890 by the Afro-American Civil War soldier George Washington 
Williams.31 Other early accusations came from humanitarian activists and from 
Protestant missionaries. After 1900 the protests gained strength and in 1903 the 
Congo atrocities became the subject of an official report by the British Consul 
Roger Casement32 and were also the topic of fierce discussions in the British as 
well as Belgian parliament. That same year E. D. Morel established the Congo 
Reform Association which was dedicated to informing the public about the 
Congo atrocities, first in Britain but soon also in the US and other countries.
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Leopold and his collaborators reacted by setting up an international cam-
paign of counterpropaganda in which they denied the accusations about the 
atrocities and questioned the trustworthiness of the testimonies about them.33 
Simultaneously, the Congo government in its ‘Bulletin Officiel’ started pub-
lishing extensive series of, often strongly manipulated, administrative reports 
which aimed to create a sense of transparency and to present the Congo Free 
State as an unexceptional colony. Leopold furthermore hired a team of world 
renowned jurists to prove the legality of his Congo rule in terms of international 
and public law.34 The initial official reactions of the Congo Free State against the 
criticisms were thus characterised by a mix of forensic style of factual denial, 
the creation of a sense of voluntary governmental transparency and legalistic 
defence strategies stressing Leopold’s lawful sovereignty and it is against this 
background that the particularity and novelty of the reaction by the commission 
of inquiry has to be understood.35
The commission of inquiry 
The commission of inquiry was not a spontaneous initiative by Leopold. It 
resulted from international – and to a lesser extent Belgian – political pressure 
and a process of negotiation between the Congo Free State, the British Foreign 
Office and civil society actors in Belgium and abroad. This particular genesis 
strongly influenced the form which the commission would eventually take. 
Sensing it could no longer avoid taking some action, the Congo government in 
August 1904 published a decree establishing a commission which had to engage 
in a ‘complete and impartial inquiry’.36 The decree appointed three commission-
ers: Edmond Janssens, Attorney General at the Court de Cassation in Brussels, 
as president of the commission; the Italian Baron Giacomo Nisco, president ad 
interim at the Court of appeal in Boma, Congo and Edmund de Schumacher, 
head of the department of justice in the Swiss canton of Lausanne. Furthermore 
the decree declared that the commissioners had to follow the instructions of 
the Secretary of the Congo State.
Although the commissioners were clearly carefully selected by Leopold, their 
names were generally received positively in Belgium and abroad.37 Other parts 
of the decree, however, were criticized heavily. In Belgium a critical reaction 
appeared in the Mouvement Géographique, a well-respected journal that was 
funded by a colonial financial holding and until then had a long history of 
being supportive of Leopold’s colonial enterprise.38 The authors of the reaction, 
Alphonse Wauters and Félicien Cattier, argued that the envisioned commis-
sion could not guarantee the revelation of the impartial truth. They especially 
criticized the fact that the commissioners had to function under governmental 
control and that their investigatory powers were restricted to those of ordinary 
officers of the Public Prosecution, which would not give them enough authority 
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to fully scrutinize the Congo administration.39 Furthermore the decree was 
criticized because it did not specify whether the hearings were going to be 
public or closed. The British Foreign Office reacted in a similar way and asked 
the Congo government to change the set-up of the commission in such a way 
as to guarantee the impartiality of its findings, the public nature of its hearings 
and the protection of witnesses.40
Confronted with these criticisms, the Congo Free State felt compelled to 
grant the commissioners more inquisitorial authorization and to give up on 
its attempt to keep full control over the commission. On September 5, 1904 
the commissioners were informed that they were granted complete ‘freedom, 
autonomy and initiative’.41 Later, extra official circulars were published which 
arranged the (nominal) protection of witnesses and informed state-agents in 
Congo that they had to collaborate with the commissioners.42 The decision on 
the public or closed character of the hearings was left to the discretion of the 
commissioners. The commissioners opted for public hearings but only com-
municated this rather late in the day, which prevented the official observer of 
the British government, consul Mackie, from arriving in time to attend the 
most important hearings.43
The commission left Belgium on 15 September 1904 to arrive about three 
weeks later, on the 5th of October, in Boma, Congo. During their long sea 
journey the members of the commission started the first collective prepara-
tions of their inquiry. This preparation time was no luxury since the members 
of the commission knew very little about the Congo Free State. Of the three 
commissioners, Janssens, de Schumacher and Nisco, only the latter had been in 
Congo. The commissioners employed two secretaries, Victor Denyn and Henri 
Grégoire, to assist them, but they too had no experience in Africa whatsoever.
The commissioners heavily depended on information but also on material 
and logistic support provided by the Congo government.44 This was certainly 
the case when they started travelling up the Congo river. The commission trav-
elled in two steamships provided by the state and also received servants and a 
large military escort. In order to secure the health of the commissioners, but 
also to make forensic style medical findings, two doctors successively joined the 
expedition. Furthermore the commissioners were assisted by two Congolese 
interpreters. All included the expedition counted around about 150 people).45
The commissioners mostly followed the route previously taken by Casement 
(Figure 1). They tried to verify as much as possible the allegiations made in 
the Casement report.46 The commission gathered around 370 statements from 
state-agents and Protestant and Catholic missionaries as well as from Congolese 
people whose testimonies were written down in French translation – although 
the archived written deposition of the latters’ statements are remarkably shorter 
than those of the white witnesses. The commissioners held most of their hear-
ings on the deck of one of their steamers and did so with all the decorum of 
a real court: they appeared in black and scarlet gowns and were flanked by 
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soldiers ‘armed with guns and bayonet fixed’.47 The commission mostly stayed 
close to the waterways, but once in a while they visited nearby villages, which 
they occasionally did without military escort and where – allegedly – ‘the pop-
ulation could freely address the commissioners.’48
The commission returned to Europe on 21 February 1905 and soon started 
preparing its final report. The writing phase would turn out to be long and diffi-
cult however. Although the report was signed by each of the commissioners, the 
text was not written collectively and the commissioners had many differences of 
opinion. Tensions ran especially high between Nisco and Janssens.49 The final 
report would become a product of negotiation and compromise. Before being 
published the manuscript of the report was moreover send to king Leopold and 
‘corrected’ by him personally.50 The final report was eventually published in the 
official bulletin of the Congo Free State on 5 November 1905. At the moment 
of the publication of the report the establishment of a new commission was 
announced, the so-called commission of the XVII, which had to study the 
findings of the commission of inquiry and propose practical solutions to the 
problems that were raised by latter’s report.51
The actual testimonies and documents upon which the report claimed to 
base its findings remained unpublished and the archive of the commission 
remained sealed until the middle of the 1980s.52 Parts of the testimonies were 
nevertheless publicly available, even before the report was released, because they 
were published by the Congo Reform Association which received them directly 
from Protestant missionaries in Congo.53 The publication of these testimonies 
Figure 1. itinerary of the commission. source: Félicien Cattier, Étude sur la situation de l’État 
indépendant du Congo (Bruxelles, 1906).
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was a very effective strategy because it significantly limited the possibilities of 
denial by the commissioners and because it kept public opinion attentive to 
the postponed report.
The report and its ambiguities: from inquiry to examination, 
between law and colonial science
The commissioners interpreted their research mandate broadly. The report 
counts 125 pages in its original French version and besides an introduction 
features eight sections which discuss a wide range of themes, among others: 
the land regime and freedom of trade, the issue of forced labour, the use of 
(punitive) military expeditions, the taking of hostages, mutilations, the land 
concessions ran by private companies, the depopulation of the Congo basin and 
its causes, the treatment of ‘abondoned’ children, the recruitment of soldiers 
and laborers and the administration of justice. Due to the different authors, 
the different sections of the report are quite heterogenous in style and content. 
The commissioners tried to discuss most of the published criticisms against the 
Congo Free State. Although explicit references are mostly absent, the report 
implicitly enters into dialogue with a set of previously published texts such as 
the Casement Report and the publications of the Congo Reform Association.
The members of the commission considered their assignment a very chal-
lenging and heroic one, not only in physical and logistic terms but also intel-
lectually. In one of the letters to his mother, secretary Henri Gregoire compared 
the intellectual efforts of the commission to the painstaking efforts of the first 
explorers who had to cut their way step by step through the tropical forest. Only 
half jokingly Gregoire wrote that ‘the commission, which has to open up a route 
toward the truth through the contradictions of the obscure psychology of the 
negro, luckily does not have to battle obstructions of such a material nature.’54
This penetration of the ‘obscure psychology of the negro’ provoked some 
profound ‘epistemic anxieties’ among the commissioners.55 The members of 
the commission speak from personal experience when they warn that a proper 
evaluation of the report will ask great intellectual effort from the readers who 
have to cast aside their European habits of thought. Most members of the com-
mission left Europe with the firm belief that they had been granted the honor 
to acquit Leopold from libellous allegiations.56 They were in for an unpleas-
ant surprise, however. What they were about to read, hear and see must have 
been quite shocking for the commissioners. The commission’s archive is full 
of handwritten notes and exclamation marks which all indicate that the com-
missioners were stunned by the amount of incriminating material which they 
found.57 Some of the findings of the commission were disconcerting even for 
their authors who were sometimes unable to find internal consensus – which 
created several ambiguities and contradictions in the report.
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A first ambiguity is related to the commissioner’s claims to epistemic author-
ity and the credibility of their research methods. There is a non-surprizing but 
still remarkable absence in the report: that of the testimonies of the Congolese. 
It is rare in the report to find textual representations of their voices. The com-
missioners give a straightforward explanation for working as little as possible 
with these testimonies in their report, even after having gathered them in large 
numbers during their research:
The black man of the Congo has not the same notion of truth that we have […] 
Truth in the eyes of the native is not what is or has been, but what ought to be, 
what he wishes, what he thinks one wishes or what is expected of him. More 
than that, he has only a very vague notion of time and is totally incapable of 
localising the events of the past. […] After a certain time, in the best of faith, he 
confounds the deeds of which he was a witness with those of which he has heard 
others speak. Great caution and unceasing patience are necessary in extracting 
from his testimony the exact truth.58
The commissioners here merely followed a widespread ‘colonial hermeneu-
tics of suspicion’59 often used by the Congo government in its strategy of denial. 
These hermeneutics of suspicion, however, created serious epistemic problems 
for the commission. The commissioners received the authority to speak as 
masters of inquiry, but the radical suspicion of indigenous witnesses made their 
mission nearly impossible because it seriously restricted the extent to which 
they could make use of the conventional procedures of (forensic) inquiry and 
of the extensive material collected during the hearings. As a contemporary 
commentator wrote, the commisioners’ radical distrust of the African witnesses 
raised the question of what then had been the value of their entire voyage in 
the Congo.60 The commissioners partly tried to solve this problem by engaging 
in an alternative type of truth-claim which was not based primarily on oral 
testimonies by the victims but on generalizing observations about the customs, 
habits and behavioural potentials of the Congolese population – and which 
with Foucault we can call ‘examination’ rather than inquiry. In many places in 
their report the commissioners make quasi-ethnological claims about allegedly 
typical behaviour and customs of ‘the natives’ – sometimes relying on their own 
observations, more often relying on second-hand observations and theses by 
missionaries and colonial personnel. The commission, for example, argues that 
the natives generally have ‘no prediliction’ for work. The core of the problem in 
Congo, according to the report, is that the natives only work if they absolutely 
need to and that they have very few needs61: ‘[the native’s] energy is only stim-
ulated by the desire to procure weapons, ornaments, or a wife; but once this 
desire is satisfied there is nothing to be done but to exist.’ The commissioners 
therefore warn that wise and prudent colonisers ‘should never lose sight of the 
nature of the Congo native[s]’62 when trying to make them work. Yet, based 
on this same claimed intimate knowledge about the nature of the ‘natives’, 
the commissioners stress that coercion is nevertheless sometimes necessary, 
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because ‘the native can understand and respect nothing but might and with this 
he confounds right.’63 Similar generalizing quasi-ethnographic ‘observations’ 
occur all over the report: the commissioners, for example, claim that military 
life has ‘great charm’ for the native since ‘it anwers to his nature’,64 they argue 
that the notorious mutilations ‘resulted from an ancient native custom’65 and 
they lament that the battle against sleeping sickness is greatly impeded by the 
alleged ‘habit’ of the natives to abandon their sick in the forest and the bad 
quality of black nursing personnel – ‘the black has no sentiment of charity’.66
Moving from inquiry to examination might have defended the commission-
ers from the potenial ridicule by pro-Leopoldian skeptics for having attributed 
too much value to the testimonies of the natives. Yet, this move also created its 
own epistemic vulnerabilities: not only did the jurists of the commission move 
far beyond their normal field of expertise, they also engaged in an epistemic 
practice for which the techniques and procedural conventions of ‘truth find-
ing’ were still far less established and widely accepted than those of the much 
older tradition of inquiry. As I will show below it was indeed precisely when 
they made knowledge claims based on practices of examination that the com-
missioners were most epistemically frail and most fiercely attacked by critics.
A second related paradox in the report concerns the statute of legal rea-
soning – and more specifially that of international and public law. As said, the 
commissioners were all trained legal scholars and practioners. Occasionally 
the commissioners indeed tried to apply principles of international and pub-
lic law to evaluate, and mostly confirm, the legitimacy of Leopold’s Congo 
government, including its claimed right to levy taxes, forcibly recruit soldiers, 
militarily ‘suppress’ revolts, etc. Yet, the efficacity of this legalist defence was 
greatly diminished by the overarching findings of the report: namely that the 
Congo Free State was ruled by legal fiction and that this fiction moreover was 
not adapted enough to the African context. What had often been presented 
as among the world’s most progressive pieces of legislation, the commission 
found, only existed on paper or was even actively meant to incapacitate the rule 
of law. In order to fix this, the commissioners argued, one needed more than 
classic European legal expertise, but also knowledge about the customs of the 
natives. This argument is very explicit in the chapter on the land regime and 
freedom of trade which features some of the most critical passages in the report. 
Leopold had developed a model of colonisation whereby the state claimed 
the ownership of enormous pieces of land which it considered ‘vacant’ and 
which it exploited as a monopolist. Until the publication of the report, critics 
of Leopold mostly criticized this monopolistic model of colonisation in legal 
terms as a breaching of international agreements made at the Conference of 
Berlin.67 The commission of inquiry, in contrast, did not question the legality 
of the state’s appropriation of vacant lands but rather questioned the meaning 
that was given to ‘vacant’ land. The commission criticized the fact that the 
Congo Free State never legally defined what were to be considered ‘occupied’ 
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lands and that it could therefore claim absolute property rights over almost 
all the land.68 The problem, according to the commissioners, arises due to the 
special African context: 
At the time of the formation of the Free State, with the exception of a few acres 
[…] there existed in the Congo no private property in the sense in which the 
term is used in European jurisprudence […] The many communities, under the 
authority of their chiefs, lived upon a vast territory belonging to the State without 
having cultivated more than a very small part of the same, but they made use of, 
in a certain measure, the surrounding lands.69
Similar criticisms about the failure of European law to take into account the 
pecularity of African reality are spread throughout the report. The commis-
sioners, for example, critcized the liberal application of a decree which gave the 
state guardianship over ‘abandoned’ or ‘orphaned’ children by arguing that in 
the ‘native classification’ orphans were rare and that even if children lost their 
biological parents there were often still other relatives to take care of them.70 
The legal period of state guardianship over these ‘orphans’ – until the age of 
25 – was criticized in similar terms: 
The Decree does not recognize the conditions of the life of the native. The length 
of life of the black seldom exceeds 30 or 35 years; the age of the adult is his six-
teenth year and the result of the provisions of the Decree as stated is to keep the 
pupils of the State in a semi-perpetual minority.71
A comparable criticism was directed at the legal regulation of the recruit-
ment of labourers. The commissioners praised the ‘civilizing’ effects of labour 
and the Congo laws which prescribed ‘absolute freedom of labour contract’.72 
Yet, they admited that these labour contracts were not always respected and 
that their long term of seven years was not adapted to the Congolese context 
because ‘the intelligence of the native reaches its apogee at the age of thirteen or 
fourteen’ and the native ‘has a very vague notion of time’.73 The commissioners 
claimed that the natives with their ‘habitual fatalism’ did not really resist their 
loss of freedom.74 Nevertheless they warned this should not encourage the 
violation of the law. In order to protect state officials and take them out of this 
‘extremely delicate position’, the commissioners proposed to adjust the law and 
make forced labour legal whenever it served ‘public utility’.75
Finally, and closely related, there is a constant tension in the report between 
culturally and ethically universalist logics on the one hand and cultural and 
ethical relativism on the other. The commissioners sometimes emphatically 
asked their readers to look through the ‘eyes of the native’ or take into account 
the ‘native classification’, while at other times they asked their readers to engage 
in the ‘common sense’ perspective of experienced colonial administrators or 
the universal laws of civilized humanity.
The members of the commission were fully convinced of the superiority 
of European laws, culture, knowledge and values which they often used as 
standards to evaluate the situation in Congo. The commissioners, for example, 
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condoned the forced recruitment of soldiers in the Congo because it merely 
applied a ‘principle which has the sanction of the majority of the European 
countries’.76 While recognizing that the Congolese generally wished not to 
change their allegedly lethargic ways of life, the commissioners argued that 
this wish could not be granted because of ‘the inflexible law of labour which 
civilisation imposes’.77 Apparently anticipating readers who might feel some 
romantic attraction in African ways of life, the commissioners warned that 
these could not ‘produce a hopeful future for the human race’.78
Yet, in order to be able to claim extenuating circumstances for the Leopoldian 
regime, and occasionally to ask empathy for particular complaints by the 
Congolese, the commissioners had to stress the particularity of the African con-
text and at least partially give up on the idea of the universality of law, morality 
and even ‘truth’. This meant embracing perspectivism and even relativism and 
unlearning the ideal of legal universalism. Nisco had already come to this con-
clusion before his assignment as a commissioner – in a report dated December 
4, 1903, for example, he argued that the Congolese context demanded other laws 
than those of Europe79 – but for the other commissioners this clearly came as a 
shock. In their final report the commissioners attempted to solve this tension 
by resorting to a reasoning about different historical stages: 
It should be always borne in mind that in spite of the progress achieved, the 
natives of the Congo are still in a large measure savages. Twenty centuries were 
necessary to create from Gaul, of the time of Caesar, the France and Belgium of 
today and if our ancestors were, in the eyes of the conquering Romans, barbar-
ians, one can, we think, say that they were civilised people in comparison with 
the inhabitants of the immense territory of the Free State at the moment of its 
constitution. […] How should one expect that a code of laws as European as 
that of the Congo should not frequently meet in its application insurmountable 
obstacles? Hence arises a contradiction between the law and the fact; hence come 
those violations which the courts punish while granting to the offenders the 
benefits of extenuating circumstances.80
Apparently doubting whether their readers, lacking colonial experience, 
would be able to fully understand this need for perspectivism, the commission-
ers added an explicit disclaimer toward the conclusion of their report: 
[…] a proper perspective is necessary. African affairs can be correctly appreciated 
only when they are seen, one might almost say, when they are lived. Examined 
from a European point of view a large number of facts […] will assume a character 
which they cannot have in the eyes of those who have been their witnesses. […]81
Immediate reception of the report in the Belgian mass media
How were people informed about the commission’s findings? Doubtlessly 
only few people in Belgium and abroad read the actual report in its original 
French version or its English translation. Most were probably informed through 
résumés and commentaries in the daily press, in periodicals or in specially 
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published pamphlets. Judging from the contemporary papers, the publication 
of the report was considered a major event in Belgium, in Britain and some 
other countries. In Belgium several daily papers dedicated a special edition 
to the commission’s report and in the first weeks after its publication many 
discussions took place in the press.
Although there was a large consensus in Belgian public opinion that the 
report was an important document, interpretations were notably diverse and 
often contradictory.82 For a great part this was doubtlessly related to the fact 
that Leopold spent considerable funds in promoting his own position through 
the press. Such contradictions were also due to the deeply divided structure of 
Belgian society along religious, socio-economic and linguistic lines (the phe-
nomenon of so-called pillarization). Members of a particular pillar in society 
had their own channels of information and were used to distrusting information 
produced by others. Yet, the contradictory readings also seem to have resulted 
from a genuine confusion about the contents of the report.
The commission received plenty of media attention from the very moment 
it was established. Although the exchange of information between Congo and 
Belgium was difficult, the papers reported as much as possible on the whera-
bouts of the commission during its mission. Journalists speculated about pos-
sible findings by interviewing people who returned from regions where the 
commission was active.83 When the commissioners returned to Belgium, jour-
nalists rushed to get the first news.84 In the long intermediary period between 
the return of the commission and the publication of the report, journals kept the 
issue alive by interviewing public figures about their expectations concerning 
the report85 and by speculating on the question whether the Commision would 
publish the testimonies it gathered.86 In the last days before the publication of 
the report, speculations ramped up and pro-Leopoldian papers started warn-
ing their readers that the commission would doubtlessly find some abuses but 
that this would mean little since abuses took place in all colonies and were not 
unknown even in a civilized country such as Belgium itself.87
Soon after the report was published, polemics started regarding its inter-
pretation. According to the socialist newspaper Le Peuple the report did not 
give the full truth because the minutes of the hearings were not published. Yet, 
even this incomplete truth, according to socialist leader Emile Vandervelde, 
confirmed all the criticisms which the socialists had been expressing for years.88 
Le Peuple did not support the general conclusions of the report, but it praised 
the commission for recognizing that the spoliation, abuses and crimes were 
systemic. The commision’s praises of the king were considered empty and forced 
diplomatic formalities and the report seen as a true ‘indictment’ and ‘condem-
nation’ of the Leopoldian system.89
The analysis by the socialist newspaper was not shared by most of the other 
major Belgian newspapers. Many newspapers stated that the commission 
praised the civilisatory progress in Congo and disproved the allegiations by 
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foreign and Belgian ’congophobes’ about the ‘cut off hands’ – which it was now 
proven, they argued, resulted from a native custom and were never committed 
by whites.90 Surely the commission noted some abuses and excesses in certain 
regions and mostly in the past, but, so argued many of the Belgian papers, the 
report clearly showed that these were not systemic and should thus not be used 
to condemn colonialism in the Congo as a system. The main point of the report 
was that the basis and principle of the colonial model is “healthy” (sain)91 and 
“fecund and truly civilizing” (féconde et vraiment civilisatrice).92
Reactions to the report among politicians and academics in 
Belgium: the scramble for colonial epistemic authority
Beyond the short term reception in the mass media, discussions on the com-
mission’s report were prolonged and intensified in a series of scholarly articles 
and monographs – with some of these publications possibly being even more 
influential than the report itself on a national level.93 Furthermore, several 
professional and civil society organisations – such as the Jeune Barreau de 
Bruxelles and the Ligue belge des droits de l’homme – discussed the report at their 
meetings.94 Finally the findings of the commission were vehemently debated in 
the political sphere, including in the Belgian (and British) parliament.
In these polemics many politicians, activists and academics seized on the 
ambiguities in the report in order make their own claims. Several commenta-
tors used the report to react against the quasi-monopoly of (a particular type 
of) legal discourse in the discussions on the Congo Free State. Remarkably it 
was often legal scholars who did so. In the years before the establishment of 
the commission, the Congo government and its supporters had often reacted 
to the accusations about the atrocities by engaging in legal reasoning and by 
defending the legality of Leopold’s sovereign rule in Congo. This strategy was 
for example used in the first official reactions to the Casement report and 
was also used by supporters of the King during debates in parliament. When 
some opposition politicians in July 1903 interpellated the Belgian minister of 
foreign affairs and doctor in law, Paul-Louis de Favereau, on the situation in 
Congo, for example, the latter responded that he was ‘talking law’ (“Je parle 
droit”)95 and that Belgium did not have the legal right to intervene in the inte-
rior affairs of Congo which was an independent country. Moreover he argued 
that what happened in Congo was entirely legal and that ‘the state can only be 
held responsible for the laws it passes’, not for the fact that some do not respect 
these laws.96 The critics of Leopold grew increasingly frustrated with this type 
of legalist discourse but they could do little more than lament that ‘the science 
of law’ was abused to justify the exploitation of the Congolese people.97
During the next large Congo debate in the Belgian parliament in February 
1906, the position of critics of Leopold had become much stronger and the 
publication of the commission’s report was a major factor in this change. Critics 
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used the report to show that the sophisticated Congolese constitution was a 
fiction that only existed on paper and that the Congo government was directly 
responsible for the atrocities because it actively undermined the rule of law 
by, for example, sending out secret orders.98 This made it much harder for 
supporters of Leopold to resort to what Stanley Cohen calls ‘magical legalism’ 
– ‘a method to “prove” that an allegation could not possibly be correct because 
the action is illegal.’99 The findings of the commission also enabled critics to 
question the authority of the small club of jurists engaged in the defence of the 
Leopoldian project and the value of their particular expertise – mostly inter-
national and public law. As Georges Lorand, a progressive liberal member of 
parliament and doctor in law, exclaimed, Congo was not ruled by a ‘science of 
law’ but by a ‘sad caricature of law’ which served the most brutal spoliation by 
‘a ridiculous abuse of the similitude of words for referring to totally different 
things and by the application of principles to situations for which they were not 
created’.100 Lorand was implicitly referring to the finding by the commission 
that the laws used to rule Congo were too European and did not to take into 
account cultural differences. Emile Vandervelde, another of Leopold’s most 
vocal critics in parliament and another jurist by training, similarly used the 
report’s findings about the need for more local cultural (and legal) knowledge 
to question the authority of classical legal discourse. Vandervelde argued that 
the question of the indigenous landrights could not be solved by armchair 
jurists: ‘one has to go study them locally. All those who have not done this, I 
reject them, even though they be professors of law’.101
Similar criticisms of abstract legalist reasoning are found in the scholarly 
works published in response to the commission’s report. Even the ‘best juridical 
reasonings – supposing they exist’, argued Félicien Cattier, a professor in law 
and author of one of the most influential critical monographs on the Congo 
Free State, ‘cannot legitimize a politics condemned as much by the principles of 
humanity as by those of political economy.’102 And he added that ‘the great skill 
of the Congo State has been to carry off the debate to the terrain of law and the 
great weakness of its adversaries has been to permit that it was not kept on its 
true terrain [i.e. the principles of humanity and political economy]’.103 Arthur 
Vermeersch, yet another doctor in law, and among the first prominent Belgian 
Catholics to openly speak out against Leopold similarly argued that after the 
findings by the commission it had become naïve ‘to open the Congolese Code to 
become ecstatic with admiration for the beauty of certain texts.’104 Vermeersch 
therefore proposed to move from ‘theory and abstraction’ to ‘concrete reality’.105 
He praised the commissioners for partially having made this move, but also crit-
icized them for not having consistently done so and for remaining stuck in rigid 
legalist reasonings. Elaborating on the commission’s argument about the all too 
European character of the laws of the Congo Free state, Vermeersch pleaded 
for legal pluralism based on a close study of Congolese customs. According to 
Vermeersch some ‘African customs can usefully be retained and put to work to 
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serve as a basis of a national law which, as the ancient German law, would not 
lack merit or originality.’106 Vermeersch was well aware of the radicality of this 
claim and knew it could be counter-intuitive to ‘modern peoples [who] like 
to contemplate the unity of the laws that rule their entire territory.’107 Yet, he 
reminded his readers that the unification of law even in France and Germany 
had come only after many centuries, and he rhetorically asked whether ‘for 
the tribes [peuplades] disseminated in the Congo basin, this unity would not 
become a mistake.’108
Several commentators also used the lack of colonial expertise of the com-
missioners to criticize the parts of the report which spoke about the nature, 
customs and behavioural potentialities of the Congolese (thus where the com-
missioners engaged in examination) or where they recommended practical 
measures for reform. Having been in Africa and ‘being travelled’ could grant 
someone great authority to speak about colonial affairs and not having done 
so, or not having been there long enough, could conversely be used against 
anybody who voiced criticism.109
The commission of inquiry had been ‘there’ and had ‘experienced’ Congo, 
yet their stay had not been very long and their colonial credentials could be 
questioned. In his discussion about the authority of the Commisson’s report, 
Félicien Cattier differentiated between on the one hand ‘the ascertainment of 
facts’ which he argued had to be considered definitive and inarguable and the 
other hand the ‘appreciations’ and ‘propositions’ made by the commissioners, 
which ‘do not carry the same weight’.110 The reason for Cattier’s scepticism 
about a part of the commission’s findings was not that all appreciations imply a 
level of subjectivity but rather that the commissioners did not have the proper 
subjectivity to make authorititative interpretations. ‘The commission’, Cattier 
argued, ‘was made up of jurisconsults who did not posses the practice nor the 
theory of colonial things.’111 Cattier especially rejected the commission’s thesis 
that a tax in the form of labour (i.e. forced labour) was necessary in Congo. In 
claiming this the commission made incomprehensible mistakes that were at 
odds with all ‘theory of colonial politics’ and with ‘the practice of all colonising 
states.’112 In order to challenge the commissioners’ authority, Cattier referred 
to ‘competent witnesses’,113 to ‘scholars competent in colonial science’,114 and to 
the experts at the international conference on colonial sociology held in Paris 
in 1900115 who had testified to the industrious nature of the Congolese and 
unanimously condemned forced labour. What the Congolese people needed, 
according to Cattier, was a ‘rational treatment’ based on ‘colonial science’.116 
‘How is it possible to do useful work in the colonies’, he wrote, ‘if one does 
not first profoundly study the indigenous institutions, their customs, their 
psychology, the conditions of their economic existence, the structure of their 
societies?’117 Cattier complained that such a scientific approach to colonisation 
had been strongly neglected in Congo under Leopoldian rule and pleaded for 
the creation of a ‘bureau of ethnological studies’.118
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Challenging the commission’s findings in the name of colonial science or 
experience was risky, however, because the King’s supporters, in their turn, 
were quick to question the scientific and experimental credentials of critics. 
Such scepticism was always possible because there was still very little consen-
sus over what constituted proper colonial knowledge and who exactly could 
speak with epistemic authority about colonial affairs. With the exception of 
geography,119 colonial scientific research and teaching developed very late in 
Belgium (starting around the last decade of the 19th century) and the country 
was running far behind its neighboring countries in this field.120 While the 
Dutch had institutionalised colonial education since the first half of the 19th 
century and the French since 1889 had an École Coloniale which offered a three 
year training for colonial administrators, the colonial agents of the Congo Free 
State for a long time generally did not receive any special training before they 
left.121 Only in 1903 did the government of the Congo Free State set up a course 
colonial to train colonial personnel, and this only involved a training of around 
three hours a day for three months.122 Even the Belgian universities for a long 
time showed little interest in Congo.123 Only in 1908 and 1909 was the first 
university level training in colonial science created respectively at the Catholic 
University of Leuven and the Université Libre de Bruxelles.124
Henri Rolin, a judge and law professor at the university of Brussels, in 
response to the polemics after the commission’s report, complained, that sud-
denly ‘everyone feels competent in colonial affairs’: 
Everybody talks about it, everybody judges and solves its questions. While one 
generally admits that physicists have physics as their proper domain and liter-
ary critics books, colonial politics (like political economy) somehow belongs to 
the public domain. The ignorance of the climatological and social conditions 
belonging to the colonies, which the specialist may study during his entire life 
without exhausting a subject so vast, thus has free play.125
This general ignorance of colonial affairs was problematic, according to 
Rolin, because the general public which is ‘well intentioned but little versed 
in colonial science’ sees that there are abuses but it does not understand their 
complex context and the best remedy. This fact, according to Rolin, was abused 
by people such as Cattier who ‘speak with an assured tone and appear to speak 
in the name of ‘science’.’126
The interference in colonial affairs of non-experts, including members of 
parliament, was dangerous, according to Rolin, because life in tropical Africa 
differs so radically from life in Europe that it does not fit any universalist model 
of reason. ‘The majority of the mistakes in colonial affairs’, Rolin claimed, ‘result 
from the fact that one does not know how, or does not want to make the intel-
lectual effort necessary to forget about the conditions existing in Europe in 
order to envision the conditions existing in Africa’.127 In making this argument 
Rolin actively played upon an ambiguity that, as argued above, was present in 
the report of the commission. Rolin was not alone in doing so. Supporters as 
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well as critics of Leopold seized upon the commission’s ambiguities concern-
ing the universality vs. relativism question to engage in a struggle over what 
was the correct way to interpret the commission’s report and African reality 
in general. Rolin’s relativist and historicist interventions in the Congo debate 
were, however, doubtlessly the most radical ones.
In a notorious article Rolin pleaded against univeral human rights claiming 
that this notion was too Eurocentric and disrespectful towards local customs.128 
Rolin argued that notions such as property and liberty made no sense in Congo 
and even claimed that the Congolese indeed had to be attached to the land, as 
serfs were in the medieval European feudal system, because this corresponded 
with the historical stage of Congo and because, letting the natives roam their 
lands would undermine the authority of local chiefs.129
It is hard to asses whether Rolin’s claims had much influence on Belgian 
public opinion but his use of relativist and historicist logics reflected a more 
widespread rhetorical technique found among supporters as well as critics of 
Leopold. In the parliamentary discussions, the conservative Catholic politician 
Charles Woeste, for example, used similar relativist and historicist arguments 
to defend Leopold’s policy in Congo and referred to the commission’s report to 
authorize these arguments. Elaborating on the commissioners’ line that ‘twenty 
centuries were necessary to create from Gaul, of the time of Caesar, the France 
and Belgium of today’, Woeste argued that it would be a mistake ‘to think that 
one governs a barbaric country with the same techniques as those in use in a 
civilised country.’130
Conclusion
Given the many contradictory claims and interpretations that existed concern-
ing the commission’s report it is hard to conceive of this report as a defining 
moment of truth in the Congo debate in Belgium. Yet, the commission did 
have some real effects, even though indirectly and most probably in a manner 
not foreseen by the commissioners.
The commission’s report and the polemics that followed created profound 
politico-epistemic struggles about who could speak with authority on Congolese 
affairs. The opinion of colonial administrators and travelers was placed against 
those of legal scholars and men speaking in the name of colonial science and 
the hierarchy between there different claims to colonial knowledge was far 
from clear or settled. A marked change that was at least partially caused by the 
commission’s report was the decreasing authority of classical legal reasoning 
in the Congo debate and the increasing epistemic authority of ‘colonial sci-
ence’ and ‘colonial scientists’. Although the commissioners themselves were 
magistrates and legal scholars, they paradoxically gave a strong impulse to 
this relatively new discursive space or epistemic culture of colonial science 
because of the specific questions they raised and due to the fact that their report 
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challenged the quasi-monopoly of specialists in international and public law 
who had until then ruled the field of colonial matters in Belgium and certainly 
the denial-campaign of Leopold and his collaborators. ‘Colonial-science’ was, 
as remarked above, a quasi non-existent field in early 20th century Belgium, 
broadly perceived as an intellectual ‘terra-nullius’ (to use some colonial terms), 
and in the years after the report we indeed see a scramble for colonial epistemic 
authority.131 Although this would remain an elite affair, many new people in 
Belgium entered the Congo debate and intellectually appropriated the colonial 
project. Rolin was right when he remarked that colonial matters increasingly 
entered the Belgian public domain.
Another important effect of the commission’s report was that it helped to 
change the focus of the debate in Belgium from a quasi-forensic discussion on 
the existence or non-existence of systemic abuses in Congo towards a so-called 
constructive discussion on colonialism as a social question which demanded 
rational and forward looking reform rather than a discussion on blame and 
guilt. It is remarkable how many of the publications that appeared in the wake 
of the commission of inquiry refer to the Congo debate as ‘the Congo question’ 
or ‘the colonial question’.132 As Arthur Vermeersch explains in his book “La 
question congolaise”: 
Our age, fertile with famous problems, has given to this word Question a new 
meaning [...] There is a social question when one debates the relations between 
the different classes, the existence of these classes and the very foundations of 
society; a question of property, because one contests the legitimacy of private 
wealth, following the famous dictum: property is theft. The labor question places 
under dispute the very principle of wage labour. One notices by these examples; 
a Question presupposes at least a controversy and a particular difficulty that has 
to be solved; it is commonly a complex problem, a set of grievances which one 
attempts to set straight, of complaints that one wants to put an end to, of claims 
that are being examined, of doubts that one tries to resolve or dispel.133
Vermeersch tellingly adds that: ‘The abuses may have given occasion to the 
Congo Question, but merely to seek the number and importance of these abuses 
is not to solve it, it is scarcely to touch it’.134
Looking at colonialism as a social question and a project of rational social 
reform had great appeal. While before the commission, much of the criti-
cism on the Congopolitics of Leopold in Belgium was anti-colonial, or at least 
sceptical or pessimistic about Belgium’s colonial capacities, this changed after 
the intervention of the commission. The commission catalyzed the creation 
of a discursive space for pro-colonial criticism of the Leopoldian regime. The 
prominent socialist leader Emile Vandervelde, for example, would in the after-
math of the commission’s report and the discussions about the annexation of 
the Congo by Belgium change his anti-colonial stance into an anti-Leopoldian 
but pro-colonial one. And this change would be of major importance for the 
stance of the socialists in relation to colonialism.
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In the parliamentary debate that was organised after the publication of the 
commission’s report, Vandervelde, for example, argued that: 
The question which have I the honor to bring before parliament is not a partisan 
question; it is equally independent from the opinion which each of us may have 
on the advantages or inconveniences of colonisation in general. I would like to, in 
making this interpellation, forget about my republican convictions, as I would like 
to see you make abstraction of your monarchist convictions; what really matters 
is exclusively to know whether the system of exploitation which rages in Congo 
does not have negative consequences for the native who are its victims as well as 
for Belgium which is its pretended beneficiary. …[the report of the commission] 
demonstrates the frightening difference which exists between a rational system 
of colonisation and the system of colonisation which exists in Congo.135
Soon after the commission of inquiry the project of rational colonisation 
became a strong ralying cry and the attention for the actual atrocities and the 
question of the guilt of the Leopoldian regime soon strongly decreased. English 
missionary Rev. John Harris, who had delivered incriminating testimonies to 
the Congo commission, shortly before the publication of the report still had 
very high expectations about the judicial potential of the findings which would 
be made: these, he felt sure, would be
so damning to the State, that if King Leopold were to take no action but to 
allow the whole infernal business to proceed unchecked, any international tri-
bunal which had powers of a criminal court, would upon the evidence of the 
Commission alone, send those responsible to the gallows.136
The effect of the commission’s findings, at least in Belgium, turned out to be 
different from that which Harris expected: rarely ever after the publication of 
its report was the question even raised whether Leopold actually deserved the 
de facto amnesty which the settlement of the Congo debate implied.137 Raising 
the Congo question indeed helped Belgium to save face with regard to foreign 
public opinion, and to take over Congo without having to incriminate its own 
king and in the longer run generally without having to deal with the burden 
of memory of the Leopoldian regime. Soon Belgians would present the Congo 
as a model colony based on principles of rational and scientific colonisation.
Although the case of the Congo Commission has some distinct features and 
although conclusions concerning this commission cannot simply extrapolated 
with regard to other cases, the case elaborated in this article does enable me 
to make some suggestions that I believe are relevant for the broader study of 
public inquiries. First I suggest that public inquiries are best understood as 
inter-textual or inter-discursive practices. Although they are generally pre-
sented differently, the discourses and knowledge claims produced by public 
inquiries never completely stand on their own and are generally less ground-
breaking or new than they can seem at first sight. Public inquiries are generally 
established as a reaction to pre-existing rumours, stories, testimonies, polit-
ical statements, scholarly publications or even official reports about wrongs, 
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injustices or misguided policies etc. Because commissions of inquiry often 
receive plenty of public attention they can in their turn strongly influence or 
transform subsequent popular or elite discourses. Moreover, particular com-
missions of inquiry historically often function against the background of longer 
(national or international) traditions of preceding inquiries which have often 
established certain procedural and discursive conventions and expectations. 
Public inquiries should therefore always be studied in relation to these preced-
ing, simultaneous and successive discourses and knowledge claims with which 
they interact and on which they depend.
My second and related point is that this interactive and often plainly reac-
tive nature of public inquiries can make them more frail on a discursive and 
epistemic level than they are often depicted. Rather than being uncontested 
hegemonic agents of Foucauldian style ‘knowledge-power’, public inquiries 
often, willingly or unwillingly, become central to negotiations over, and con-
testations of, knowledge-power and epistemic authority. In the analysis above 
I have tried to demonstrate that the epistemic authority of commissions of 
inquiry is far from self-evident, that it has to be actively claimed and defended 
by commissioners and that this can fail.
My third point, however, is that this epistemically frailty of public inquiries 
does not necessarily diminish their potential political impact. To the contrary, 
commissions paradoxically can sometimes have considerable impact, and thus 
in a sense be successful, because of their failure to produce a fully authoritative 
discourse about the issues they address in their reports. The successful failure 
of the Congo Commission and the considerable impact which it had on the 
longer term history of Belgian colonialism show the complexity of conceptu-
alizing and assessing the impact of public of inquiries. Clearly one should not 
exclusively focus on the quality of the knowledge yielded by their ‘findings’ or 
the (absence of) direct policy impact of their recommendations. The skeptical 
or even cynical tone of much writing in public inquiries indeed seems to come 
from an all too strong focus on these aspects. It has rightly been remarked that 
public inquiries seldom produce extensive new knowledge – that their ‘yield of 
facts’ is hardly ever in balance with the energy and costs they take – and that 
their recommendations have a disheartingly small chance of being politically 
implemented.138
Yet, I argue that the potential impact of public inquiries does not only relate 
to the direct knowledge claims or policy proposals they make but also to the way 
in which they may stimulate or restrain others in making knowledge claims or 
policy proposals. It is important to pay attention to how commissions’ findings 
interact with existing beliefs or knowledge systems, how they can transform 
the status of competings truth claims and how they may enable some to speak 
with perceived epistemic authority while disabling others’ ability to do so.139
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